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Assessing and Discerning the E®ects of Recent Private Health Insurance Policy
Initiatives in Australia
The Australian government implemented several new policy initiatives during 1997{
2000, with the stated aim of raising the take-up rate of private health insurance. Taken
together, these policy initiatives were quite e®ective, the proportion of the population
with private health insurance cover increased by more than 35%. However, much less
clear is the e®ectiveness of di®erent components of the policies, due to their sequential
implementation. Since there are large cost di®erences in implementing these policies, an
understanding of the e®ects of each policy is important for policymaking. This paper at-
tempts to isolate the e®ects of di®erent policies using the 1995 and 2001 National Health
Survey data. The two datasets allow the estimation of private health insurance demands
before and after the policy changes. The results were used to perform a counterfactual
analysis of what would have happened had there been no new policies. Further, utilizing
the age-speci¯c aspect of Lifetime Health Cover, we are able to isolate its contribution
to within 42% and 75% of the increase in private health insurance membership.1 Introduction
The Australian health care system is based on an universal access principle, under
which every person regardless of income is entitled to be a member of Medicare, a
universal health insurance scheme. However, private health insurance (PHI) has always
been a prominent feature of the Australian health system, despite the availability of a
publicly funded alternative since 1975.1 For much of the 1990s, some 30% to 40% of the
population is covered by PHI. It is, however, plainly obvious that the coverage of PHI
has been on a declining trend since the introduction of Medibank in 1975. There are
a variety of reasons, not least of which is the appeal of the publicly funded alternative
(Medibank/Medicare) to the masses.
With a purported goal of reducing the burden on public hospitals, the Australian gov-
ernment implemented a sequence of new policies during 1997-2000. The three major
policy initiatives are, in chronological order: (i) The Private Health Insurance Incen-
tives Scheme (PHIIS), introduced in 1997, which imposes a tax levy on high-income
earners who do not have PHI, and a means-tested subsidy scheme for low-income earn-
ers who purchase PHI. (ii) A 30% premium rebate, introduced in 1999, to replace the
means-tested subsidy under PHIIS. The 30% rebate is non-means tested, and applies to
all private health insurance policies, including existing ones that were already in place.
(iii) Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), introduced in 2000, permits a limited form of age-
related risk rating by private health insurance funds. Under LHC, insurance funds are
allowed to discriminate consumers by age at time of entry. The immediate aim of these
policies was to raise the take-up rate of private health insurance (PHI). As a result of
these policies, the proportion of the population with private hospital cover increased
from 31% in 1999 to more than 45% in 2001, an increase of more than 14 percentage
points in two years. Two components of the new policies, the 30% premium rebate and
Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), have been widely regarded as the most e®ective in raising
the PHI take-up rate. It is not clear, however, what proportion of the increase can be
attributed to which of those policies.
Butler (2002) examines the trend in the proportion of population with private hospi-
tal insurance cover between June 1984 and March 2002. By noting the timing of the
sequential policies introduced beginning in mid-1997, he argues that it was LHC that
induced the bulk of the increase in PHI take-up rate. Using a similar policy timing idea
1The ¯rst universal health insurance system was announced in 1972 and put in place in 1975 under
the name of Medibank. The name was changed to Medicare in 1984 following some major revamps of
the scheme.
1but with a more rigorous trend analysis, Frech et al. (2003) attempt to measure the
relative impact of the di®erent policies. They estimate that the 30% rebate lead to an
11% increase in PHI demand. However, they were not able to disentangle the e®ects of
the rebate and the LHC. The substantial cost di®erences between the two policies have
attracted heated debate among academics and policymakers as to the cost-e®ectiveness
of each policy. Duckett and Jackson (2000) estimate that the 30% rebate costs more
than $2 billions per year while LHC costs practically nothing to the government. From
an economic e±ciency point of view, it is clearly desirable to be able to distinguish the
contributions of the two policies for better policymaking.
This paper departs from previous studies by using micro-level cross-section data to dis-
entangle the e®ects of the two policies. We argue that although a signi¯cant proportion
of the increase in PHI coverage occurred after the introduction of LHC, this policy
was introduced on top of, not in place of, the 30% premium rebate and the tax levy
under PHIIS. This means that the separate contributions of these policies cannot be
readily inferred from time series data. Using cross-sectional micro-level data, this paper
contributes to the discussion by providing separate estimates of the e®ects of the 30%
rebate and LHC. A signi¯cant improvement over previous studies comes from our use
of micro-level model of PHI demand, which allows us to take advantage of the design
of the two policies to separate their e®ects. Using unit record data from the 1995 and
2001 National Health Survey (NHS) data, we estimate PHI demand equations before
and after the implementation of the new policies, separately for single individuals and
families. This allows us to construct a counterfactual scenario to measure the e®ects
of the new policies on PHI take-up rate for those people who are highly unlikely to be
covered without these new policies. Furthermore, utilizing the age criterion of the LHC
policy, we are able to separately identify the contribution of LHC. For singles, we ¯nd
that the LHC accounts for at least 42% and at most 61% of the total increase in take-up
rate. For families, the corresponding ¯gures are 42% and 78% of the total increase,
respectively. The total e®ects of LHC, inclusive of singles and familes, are between 42%
and 75% of the total increase. While these ¯gures show the signi¯cant impact of LHC
on PHI take-up, they are much lower than those suggested by previous studies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief discussion
on the changes in the private health insurance policies. This will be followed by the
empirical model speci¯cations and an explanation of data and variable construction in
section 3. In section 4 we discuss and interpret the empirical results. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
22 PHI Policy Changes
There are three major sets of PHI policy changes implemented between 1997 and 2000
which may a®ect PHI demand. The ¯rst set, introduced in 1997, includes a means-
tested PHI premium subsidy and a 1% Medicare tax surcharge for high income earners
who is not covered by an approved PHI policy. Then, in 1999, the means tested rebate
was replaced with a non-means tested 30% premium rebate for all PHI policies. Fi-
nally, introduced in 2000, are Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), which allow health funds
to discriminate consumers according to their age of entry into the fund. Because of
the continuing decline in PHI take-up rate even after the introduction of the ¯rst set of
policies, the 30% premium rebate and particularly LHC, have been widely regarded as
the most e®ective policies and therefore are the focus of most earlier studies.
The basic idea of the LHC scheme is to induce the low risk population back into the
private health insurance system. It was mainly a response to the ¯ndings that more and
more low-risk individuals were leaving the PHI system, resulting in a system consisting
mostly of the high-risk groups{a phenomenon often referred to as the \adverse selection
spiral" (see for example, Industry Commission, 1997). Consequently, the scheme was
designed around a ¯nancial penalty for the low risk groups. The target group was
individuals between 30 and 65 years old. The amount of the penalty is set at 2% of
the premium for each year beyond the age of 30 for anyone in the targeted population
entering a health fund for the ¯rst time.
As can be seen from Figure 1, immediately following the introduction of LHC, PHI
membership jumped from 31% of the population at the end of 1999 to more than 45%
at the end of 2000. Thus, one is naturally tempted to attribute most of the e®ects to
LHC. However, there are several plausible reasons why the e®ects of the 30% rebate
should not be discounted entirely. First, only approximately 12% of the 2001 NHS
respondents of age 30-65 years regarded LHC as one of the reasons for having PHI.
Second, the same data reveal that the same age group only accounts approximately for
72% of the population with PHI. Lastly, consumer theory asserts that what matters in
the end is whether or not having PHI is optimal given an individual's budget constraint.
It is quite plausible then that the jump following the introduction of LHC would have
been much smaller if PHI were still una®ordable in the absence of the rebate.


















































































































3 Empirical Framework and Data
The speci¯cation of our empirical models follows Cameron and Trivedi (1991), and is
similar to other Australian studies, such as Hopkins and Kidd (1996) and Barret and
Conlon (2003). The basic framework is motivated by the theory of consumer choice
under uncertainty, where an individual only purchases PHI if the expected utility from
purchasing exceeds that from not purchasing. The decision to purchase PHI can thus
be speci¯ed as a discrete choice model. That is, de¯ning the binary variable PHI as an
observed random variable with value 1 if PHI is chosen, and value 0 otherwise. The
probability of purchasing PHI is
Pr[PHI = 1] = f(x;¯) + e; (1)
where x is a vector of observable individual characteristics, ¯ is the corresponding vector
of parameters to be estimated, and e is a random term representing the unobservables.
We specify f so that (1) can be estimated as a standard logit model. Following the three
studies cited above, x contains variables that capture variations in (i) expected medical
needs (gender, family size, age, doctor visits); and (ii) risk aversion, preference as well
as other socio-economic background (smoking, income, types of employment, residential
area, and education). Missing from the list is the rate of insurance premium, which
4unfortunately is not available from existing Australian data sets.
We estimate (1) twice, one for 1995 and one for 2001. The 2001 estimates provides
variations in the marginal e®ects and the predicted probabilities across age groups. The
1995 estimation provides us with the average decision rules used by individuals before the
set of the policy changes were in place. Thus, by applying the estimated 1995 \decision
rule" on the 2001 population, we obtain estimates of what would have happened if there
were no policy changes between the two period. Based on these estimates, we decompose
the observed proportion of population with PHI in 2001 into (i) those who would have
purchased PHI even when there were no policy change, and (ii) those who would not.
Further, utilizing the age dependent design of the LHC policy, we separate the impact
of LHC from that of the 30% premium rebates. This is done by taking the di®erence in
the average probabilities between the LHC target group (age 30{65) and the non-target
group (age 18{29).
The data for the estimation come from the Con¯dentialised Unit Record Files of the
1995 and the 2001 National Health Surveys. The interview of the 2001 survey took place
between February and November 2001. Therefore, we are con¯dent that it captured
most, if not all, of the e®ects of PHI policy changes. In their original formats, these
data sets contain respectively 26,862 and 53,828 unit records for 2001 and 1995. Given
the plausibly di®erent PHI decisions between singles and families, we split the data
¯les accordingly and estimate (1) separately for singles and families in each survey.
In addition, since the 2001 survey only randomly interviewed a single adult from a
family type of households while the 1995 survey interviewed all adults in the sampled
households, we randomly select a single adult from households in the 1995 data. This
is to ensure that the two samples are comparable across time. Finally, there are several
data cleaning steps that we take. These include dropping full-time students, non-family
members, age below 18 for singles and age below 20 for families, and singles below age 22
who may be covered by family PHI. After all of these data preparation steps, we end up
with useable records of, respectively for the 1995 and 2001 NHS, 4,648 and 4,710 singles
and 7,059 and 9,543 families. Table 1 lists the variables used in the estimation. Note
that all person description variables in the case of family units refer to the characteristics
of the selected adult of the particular family.
In addition to variables listed in Table 1, we also include 13 regional dummy vari-
ables, which denote whether the unit's residence is in a metro or rural area in each
state/territory, and 13 age dummy variables, with value 1 if the unit's age falls in the
indicated age interval.
5Table 1: List of variables in logit estimation
Dependent variable
PHI Private health insurance (1=Yes, 0=N0).
1=if hospital cover (with or without ancillary) is purchased.
(for family, 1=if at least one family member has hospital cover).
Explanatory variables
female dummy, 1=female (not applicable for family units).
immig dummy, 1=immigrant.
govcrd dummy, 1=government concession/entitlement card holder.
stdinc standardised value of annualised weekly income (actual - mean income).
stdinc2 squared standardised income.
famsize number of persons living in the household (not applicable for singles).
childlt6 number of children of age · 6 years (not applicable for singles).
degree dummy, 1=has a Bachelor degree or higher.
diploma dummy, 1=has an associate diploma.
postscd dummy, 1=has basic, skilled, and/or other post-secondary quali¯cations.
admin dummy, 1=occupation is in an administrative position.
trade dummy, 1=occupation is trade.
clrksrv dummy, 1=occupation is clerical or services.
prof dummy, 1=occupation is in the professional category.
paraprof dummy, 1=occupation is paraprofessional.
plantop dummy, 1=occupation is categorized as plant operator.
drvisit1{4 dummy variables, 1=has a doctor visit within last 2 weeks,
2 weeks{3 months, 3{6 months, 6-12 months.
chdrvis1-4 De¯ned similarly as above for the children (not applicable for singles).
chnum number of long-term chronic conditions.
chnumcld number of long-term chronic conditions of the children
(not applicable for singles).
smoker dummy, 1=current regular smoker.
64 Results
Table 2 summarizes the estimated coe±cients of the PHI demand model as speci¯ed in
(1), for singles and families, and in 1995 and 2001. As can be seen from the table, most
of the usual determinants of PHI demand are signi¯cant and have the expected signs.
Demand is increasing in income, but this e®ect is diminishing as suggested by the nega-
tive sign of the squared income term. This probably captures the preference for private
health care and at the same time the ability to a®ord the costs of the insurance. Com-
paring the coe±cients of 1995 and 2001, we see that the signs of estimated coe±cients
are mostly as expected and consistent in both years. For examples, the coe±cients for
gender, income, education, occupation, risk aversion, and health risks are quite stable in
both years. There is no variable which shows a signi¯cant reversal in sign from positive
signi¯cant to negative signi¯cant or vice versa.
Contrary to what one would expect from adverse selection, smokers, whether single or
in a family, are associated with signi¯cantly lower probabilities of having PHI in both
years. One possible explanation is that this simply re°ects the lower risk aversion of
smokers, and this possibly dominates the higher health care needs consideration.
The signs of the estimated coe±cients for doctor visits and the number of chronic con-
ditions are consistent with usual expectations that they capture the expected medical
needs in the future. All else equal, units with higher expected medical needs have on
average higher probabilities for being covered with PHI. One particularly interesting
¯nding from the family equation is that the coe±cients on doctor visits suggest that, in
1995, the expected medical needs of the children seem to be more important than those
of the adults. Also, in the same year, demand seems to increase with family size but at
the same time decrease with the number of young children (aged less than six).
Some interesting results can be further revealed from comparisons between the 1995 and
2001 estimated coe±cients. For example, if the policy changes induce more individual
from the lower risk group to join PHI membership, we should see that the importance
of the risk related variables to be lower in 2001. The doctor visits variables of singles
and families, both adult and children, seem to indicate that this is the case. Except
for \drvisit3" and \drvisit4" of families, the magnitudes of the estimated coe±cients
decrease between the two periods. However, the other risk-related variables, e.g., number
of chronic conditions and smoking, seem to provide contradicting evidence.
Other interesting results come from the comparison of the age coe±cients. Since all
7other policy changes except LHC are basically age independent, we would expect that
on average, the distance between LHC target group (age 30-65) and LHC non-target
group (age 18-29 and age 65+) would increase. In other words, since the base age group
(age 40{44) belongs in the LHC target group, the estimated coe±cients of non-target
group should be lower in 2001. The evidence seems to support this.
Since among our primary concerns is to isolate the e®ect of LHC, we examine the age
coe±cients in greater details. Table 3 presents the average marginal e®ects of all age
variables with respect to the base age group (age 40{44) in 2001. In addition, the
table also gives the predicted probabilities for the base age group so that the predicted
probabilities of all other age groups can be inferred directly from their marginal e®ects.
These age-dependent variations in predicted probabilities will allow the e®ects of LHC
to be separated from other e®ects. To do this, we de¯ne three di®erent age groups:
18-29, 30-69, and 70+. The ¯rst and third groups are, by the policy design, not LHC
target groups. In addition, the ¯rst group's risk pro¯le should not di®er too much from
the base age group and even from the entire LHC target group. It is also probably the
least risky group. In other words, controlling for all other observable PHI determinants,
their predicted probabilities would re°ect more or less the e®ects of non-LHC policies,
chie°y the 30% premium rebate. On the other hand, the third group can be considered
as the highest risk group. Therefore, we can expect that the di®erence between Groups 1
and 2 is a much more accurate re°ection of the LHC e®ects than the di®erence between
Groups 2 and 3.
We ¯rst compute the average predicted probabilities of having PHI for Groups 1 and
2. For singles, the averages are 11.5% and 37.2%, respectively. For families, the cor-
responding ¯gures are 27.6% and 58.3%. Then, by the above reasoning, the di®erence
between the average probabilities of Groups 1 and 2 would represent the part of pre-
dicted probabilities in Group 2 which are not common to the two groups. Since the
di®erence between these two age groups arises mostly from the fact that latter belongs
in the LHC target group while the former is not, the di®erence is thus an estimate of the
e®ect of LHC. The di®erences are 25.7 percentage points and 21.1 percentage points,
respectively, for singles and families. Expressed as a percentage of the average predicted
probabilities, LHC accounts for approximately 68% and 53%, respectively, of the average
probabilities of having PHI for singles and families in Group 2.
Since we have isolated the e®ects of LHC on singles and families, the next step is to
apply these percentages to arrive at estimates of the extent of the rise in PHI membership
that can be attributed to LHC. To do this, we need to ¯rst estimate the rise in PHI
8membership due to all policy initiatives introduced between 1995 and 2001. For this
purpose, we create a hypothetical situation by applying the 2001 NHS data on the 1995
coe±cient estimates. In so doing, we in e®ect \force" singles and families in 2001 to
apply the decision rules as embodied in the 1995 coe±cients, which presumably would
not re°ect the e®ects of policy initiatives introduced after 1995. In this sense, we create
a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario to which we can compare the actual predicted
probabilities for 2001 and arrive at estimates of the e®ects of the policy initiatives
introduced after 1995.
Table 4 presents the results of the decomposition. Looking at the last column of the
table, 36.9% of single individuals had PHI in 2001, and this consists of 21.4% who would
have had PHI in 2001 even if the government introduced no new policy initiatives, and
the other 15.5% who took up PHI in response to the new policy initiatives. Similarly
for families, 51.9% had PHI in 2001, and this can be decomposed into 21.8% who would
have had PHI even if there were no new policy initiatives, and the remaining 30.1% who
were new to PHI memberships, presumably in response to the new policy initiatives.
Columns 2-4 of the same table provide a breakdown of the above ¯gures into three age
groups: Groups 1{3 that we de¯ned above. For example, in column 3, we see that
out of the 15.5 percentage points of singles who took up PHI in response to the new
policies, approximately 9.4 percentage points (or 61% of 15.5) were from Group 2, the
LHC target group. By design, we do not expect LHC to have any e®ects on the other
two age groups. Thus, if we attribute all new PHI enrollees in the LHC target group to
the e®ect of LHC, we can say that at most 61% of all singles who responded to the new
policy initiatives were due to LHC. This forms the upper bound of the total e®ects of the
LHC on singles. By the same reasoning, we obtain the upper bound of the LHC e®ect
for families as 78%. Notice however that the true e®ects are probably much lower than
these upper bounds since the latter are obtained on the assumption that individuals and
families in Age Group 2 responded only to LHC and not other policy initiatives.
We next attempt to establish the lower bounds. First, we breakdown the proportion of
new PHI enrollees in each age group into those who enrolled because of the LHC policy,
and those who enrolled because of other policy initiatives. As argued earlier, we assume
that none of the new enrollees in Groups 1 and 3 can be attributed to the e®ects of LHC.
Applying the results discussed earlier and summarized in Table 3, we have as much as
6.4% of singles who were new PHI enrollees as a result of LHC. This is approximately
41% of the all singles who responded to the new policy initiatives. Since this ¯gure is
obtained by assuming that LHC does not a®ect the other two age groups, it represents
9the lower bound of the LHC e®ect on singles. By the same reasoning, we arrive at the
lower bound for families, which is estimated to be around 42%. We note that the true
magnitude of the total e®ects should be much closer to the lower bound than to the
upper bound. This is simply any e®ects of LHC on those in Groups 1 and 3, say because
of confusion in understanding the regulations, would most likely be small.
Lastly, it is worth noting that a weighted average scheme can be used to obtain an inter-
val estimate for the total e®ect of LHC on the whole population. Since approximately
20% of the respondents in the 2001 NHS are singles, thus a 1:4 ratio seems appropriate.
Using this weight, we estimate that LHC accounts for between 42% and 75% of the rise
in PHI membership in the Australian population. For reasons we mentioned above, we
think the true value is likely to be much closer to the former than the latter.
5 Conclusion
Economic e±ciency alone dictates that if a policy costs less and yields higher desired
e®ects, then it should be a preferred option. Among the recent Australian private health
insurance policy initiatives, the Lifetime Health Cover policy costs almost nothing while
the 30% premium rebate costs approximately $2 billions per year. The crucial question
is whether or not the latter, a much more expensive policy, is completely ine®ective, as
claimed by many authors and policy commentators.
By looking at time series data and noting the date of implementation, one gets the
impression that Lifetime Health Cover seems to account for most of the increase in
private health insurance take-up rates. Such a conclusion could be warranted if not for
the following considerations. First, the 30% premium rebate pre-dated Lifetime Health
Cover, thus the jump in private health insurance memberships one observes may very well
be due to the rebate as well. Second, Lifetime Health Cover is very speci¯c in its target
groups and these target groups account for less than 72% of private health insurance
membership in 2001. Moreover, a signi¯cant proportion of those in the target groups
were in fact already covered by private health insurance before those policy initiatives
were implemented. Thus, the increase in private health insurance memberships in these
groups may not account for the bulk of the overall increase in private health insurance
memberships. Third, data from the 2001 National Health Survey indicate that only a
small fraction of people in the target groups cited Lifetime Health Cover as their reasons
for purchasing private health insurance.
10Mindful of these arguments, we proceed to untangle the e®ects of the Lifetime Health
Cover from other policy initiatives. We do so by estimating private health insurance
demand models using micro-level data before and after the policy initiatives were in
place. The main ¯ndings are that Lifetime Health Cover accounts for at least 42% and
at most 75% of the overall increase in private health insurance membership. We also
argue that the true share of Lifetime Health Cover would probably be much closer to the
lower bound. Thus, we can conclude that the contribution of the 30% premium rebate
could be far more substantial than most authors and commentators believe.
There are several possibilities of how this study can be improved. First, in modeling
private health insurance demand, we do not consider the fact that PHI in Australia
is secondary to a freely available alternative, the Medicare. A more careful modeling
of such duplicate cover, for example see Vera-Hernandez (1999), may result in more
precise estimates. Another important improvement can be made by carefully taking
into account the e®ects of the 1% Medicare levy on high income earners. This can be
done, for example, by using the regression discontinuity approach by exploiting the fact
that the levy only kicks in after a speci¯c income threshold. This should result in a
more precise accounting of the contributions of each policy initiative.
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age2024 -0.5952 (0.1870) -0.9805 (0.2070) -0.8098 (0.1636) -1.6430 (0.1747)
age2529 -0.7007 (0.1949) -1.0732 (0.1883) -0.6603 (0.1274) -1.0879 (0.1155)
age3034 -0.4292 (0.2089) -0.1289 (0.1846) -0.3250 (0.1126) -0.4373 (0.1024)
age3539 -0.0543 (0.2156) 0.1032 (0.1927) -0.1857 (0.1051) -0.2344 (0.0927)
age4549 -0.0394 (0.2220) 0.2628 (0.1882) 0.3269 (0.1094) 0.2634 (0.1006)
age5054 0.4454 (0.2388) 0.3608 (0.1839) 0.5895 (0.1278) 0.5293 (0.1162)
age5559 0.7154 (0.2526) 0.6268 (0.1963) 1.2171 (0.1450) 0.8211 (0.1321)
age6064 1.3306 (0.2549) 0.7926 (0.2020) 1.2532 (0.1601) 1.0693 (0.1385)
age6569 1.4676 (0.2560) 1.0976 (0.2110) 1.5729 (0.1691) 1.4716 (0.1501)
age7074 1.5527 (0.2619) 1.0492 (0.2065) 1.6152 (0.1764) 1.6224 (0.1538)
age7579 1.6471 (0.2589) 0.8378 (0.2120) 1.4840 (0.2138) 0.9422 (0.1691)
age80p 1.5411 (0.2594) 1.0070 (0.2055) 1.5241 (0.2747) 1.0628 (0.2070)
degree 0.2789 (0.1372) 0.4850 (0.1252) 0.4173 (0.1021) 0.5120 (0.0884)
diploma -0.0025 (0.1479) 0.4031 (0.1344) 0.2518 (0.0999) 0.3701 (0.0873)
postscd 0.2375 (0.1003) 0.2685 (0.0905) 0.0848 (0.0700) 0.1453 (0.0603)
admin 0.2777 (0.2132) 0.7642 (0.2176) 0.7530 (0.1181) 0.6337 (0.1248)
trade 0.0109 (0.1702) -0.1349 (0.1907) 0.1020 (0.1112) -0.0370 (0.1045)
prof 0.2484 (0.1867) 0.2224 (0.1727) 0.5331 (0.1197) 0.3187 (0.1009)
paraprof 0.0467 (0.2259) 0.3382 (0.1827) 0.5854 (0.1386) 0.5289 (0.1036)
continued on next page...
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Variables Single Family
1995 2001 1995 2001
clrksrv 0.3099 (0.1425) 0.3032 (0.1412) 0.5462 (0.0846) 0.4175 (0.0770)
plantop -0.2266 (0.2478) -0.1256 (0.2063) 0.1721 (0.1451) -0.3568 (0.1183)
drvisit1 0.5043 (0.1390) 0.2887 (0.1305) 0.2329 (0.0968) 0.1767 (0.0845)
drvisit2 0.3347 (0.1304) 0.2949 (0.1261) 0.1585 (0.0896) 0.1669 (0.0812)
drvisit3 0.4567 (0.1448) 0.2341 (0.1418) 0.1374 (0.1013) 0.2790 (0.0900)
drvisit4 0.3406 (0.1537) 0.2039 (0.1522) 0.2009 (0.1070) 0.2942 (0.0944)
chnum 0.0350 (0.0196) 0.0703 (0.0259) 0.0196 (0.0149) 0.0533 (0.0172)
chnumcld 0.0061 (0.0460) 0.0580 (0.0422)
chdrvis1 0.4360 (0.1754) 0.1548 (0.1555)
chdrvis2 0.3993 (0.1637) 0.0777 (0.1417)
chdrvis3 0.3510 (0.1867) 0.0123 (0.1550)
chdrvis4 0.0618 (0.1994) 0.0121 (0.1740)
smoker -0.6683 (0.0940) -0.6513 (0.0885) -0.5470 (0.0698) -0.6587 (0.0614)
constant -1.5804 (0.2494) -2.3054 (0.8895) -1.1047 (0.2178) 0.3206 (0.4356)
N 4648 4710 7059 9543
PHI=1 25% 37% 44% 52%
Figures in parentheses are standard errors




e®ects Pr[PHI=1] e®ects Pr[PHI=1]
Reference Group
Age40{44¤ { 0.2861 { 0.5099
Age Group 1
Age18{19 -0.1960 0.0901 { {
Age20{24 -0.1555 0.1306 -0.2762 0.2337
Age25{29 -0.1610 0.1251 -0.1914 0.3185
Within group average 0.1153 0.2761
Age Group 2
Age30{34 -0.0164 0.2697 -0.0781 0.4317
Age35{39 0.0233 0.3094 -0.0420 0.4679
Age45{49 0.0526 0.3387 0.0472 0.5571
Age50{54 0.0714 0.3576 0.0942 0.6041
Age55{59 0.1197 0.4059 0.1435 0.6534
Age60{64 0.1491 0.4352 0.1821 0.6919
Age65{69 0.2031 0.4892 0.2408 0.7506
Within group average¤ 0.3722 0.5833
Age Group 3
Age70{74 0.1941 0.4803 0.2616 0.7715
Age75{79 0.1552 0.4413 0.1610 0.6709
Age80 & above 0.1864 0.4726 0.1805 0.6904
¤ inclusive of reference age group
15Table 4: Decomposition of Proportion With Private Health Insurance in 2001¤
Age Group
18{29¤¤ 30{69 70+ All
Singles 3.7 25.0 8.2 36.9
No policy change 0.8 15.6 4.9 21.4
Attributed to new policies 2.9 9.4 3.2 15.5
30% Premium Rebate 2.9 3.0 3.2 9.1
Lifetime Health Cover 0 6.4 0 6.4
Families 3.7 44.0 4.1 51.9
No policy change 0.3 20.6 1.0 21.8
Due to new policies 3.4 23.5 3.2 30.1
30% Premium Rebate 3.4 11.0 3.2 17.6
Lifetime Health Cover 0 12.5 0 12.5
¤ all ¯gures are percentage points
¤¤ for families: 20-29
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